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Companies in capital-intensive indus-tries have increasingly used project finance to fund large-scale capital expenditures as they become more 
comfortable with asset structuring. Over the 
2001–2010 period, private companies have 
deployed on average more than $200 billion 
a year globally in project finance, and Islamic 
finance makes up around 30% of the project 
finance market in the Arab Gulf states.
The decision to use project f inance 
involves an explicit choice regarding both 
organizational form and financial structure. 
With project finance, sponsoring firms create 
legally distinct entities to develop, manage, 
and finance a particular project. These enti-
ties borrow on a limited or nonrecourse basis, 
which places heavier reliance on loan repay-
ments securitized by the project’s cash f lows 
rather than on the assets or general credit 
of the sponsoring organizations. Despite the 
non-recourse nature of borrowing for capital 
outlay, projects are generally highly leveraged 
entities, especially in the resources sector. 
Debt to total capitalization ratios average 
60%–70% (Esty [2005]) but are often as high 
as 95%.
Traditional sources of debt are not a 
perfect match for project finance opportuni-
ties. Often significant differences arise in the 
investment horizon, cash f low profile, and 
appetite for risk given the complex nature 
of some projects (Davis [2005]). The key 
question is, if f irms use project f inance as 
an alternative to traditional on-balance-sheet 
corporate finance, is there a natural source of 
capital whose characteristics match the risk 
and return profiles of capital-intensive indus-
tries? Although recent research has made 
progress in answering the broader question 
relating to the use of project financing, little 
research has been conducted in identifying 
the ideal investment profile of backers in 
capital-intensive industries.
The major limitation of project finance 
options available to companies in resources 
and extractive industries is the allowable 
duration for debt financing. Western finan-
cial institutions hesitate to engage in limited-
recourse borrowing arrangements beyond 7 
years, and certainly 10 years is generally the 
longest horizon for non-government sup-
ported capital investments. Projects devel-
oped in the resources sector can often take 
at least 7–10 years just to return positive cash 
f lows, especially ones that require substan-
tial downstream infrastructure development 
for transporting commodities to buyers. As 
resource projects become more complex and 
are conducted in regions subject to higher 
political and economic risks, the investment 
horizons are becoming greater, with the sub-
sequent retreat of project funding interest 
from Western banks. This widening gap 
appears well suited, however, to the more 
patient and long-term investment horizons 
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sought by Islamic funds, despite the stricter conditions 
under which funding may be provided.
Firms in the resources sector are seeking financing 
from investors and creditors whose investment horizon 
constraints are less limited than with traditional commer-
cial bank financing. Some firms in the sector are actively 
seeking to convert their traditional loan agreements into 
Shariáh-based loans for two reasons. First, the curtailed 
eagerness of Western banks to fund risky, long-term 
development has accelerated the search for alternatives. 
Second, Shariáh investors are seen to be more forgiving 
to borrowers experiencing troubled times than Western 
banks. One key idea that is generating this interest is 
that Islamic funding resembles an investment partnership 
rather than a formal, legal debtor–creditor agreement 
(Rehman [2008]), implying that such funding contains 
greater f lexibility and can remain in place over a much 
longer term. Proponents of Islamic funding claim that 
links with Shariáh financiers are a lot more secure than 
relationships with Western banks. For instance, despite 
Western banks permitting smaller costs on exit than their 
Shariáh investor counterparts, they still retain great f lex-
ibility to abandon the project when trouble looms.
We discuss the use of Islamic funds for project 
financing activities in capital-intensive industries with 
particular reference to the resources sector and examine 
the risk-return profile of Shariáh-compliant investors. 
Within the constraints of Shariáh law, Islamic funds 
are suited for project f inancing opportunities in the 
resources sector and possess many advantages over tra-
ditional sources of financing.
MODERN STRUCTURED FINANCE
Under the trade-off theory of capital structure, 
a firm should increase leverage to the point where the 
marginal gain from incremental tax shields equals the 
marginal loss from incremental distress costs (Harris 
and Raviv [1991]). The probability that a company will 
incur significant distress costs depends heavily on its 
leverage and asset risk. For a given level of asset risk, 
the probability of distress increases with leverage. Alter-
natively for a given leverage ratio, the probability of 
distress increases with asset risk. Shareholders sell the 
safest cash f lows to creditors who agree to forgo the 
upside potential in return for taking a senior claim on 
the cash f lows. With low-risk assets, shareholders can 
sell a majority of the expected cash f lows to debt holders 
and in return obtain interest tax shields. The reduction 
in cash f low volatility allows firms to add leverage and 
increase value from interest tax shields. In the resources 
sector, many projects have relatively low asset risk and 
therefore can accommodate a correspondingly high level 
of debt (Esty [2005]). This phenomenon has led to a 
growth in the debt financing of specific assets securi-
tized by expected cash f lows and the asset itself and the 
most popular mechanism used is project financing.
Project finance is now an established vehicle for 
companies seeking new ways to finance large natural 
resource discoveries. Project finance is popular in the 
resources sector because projects can be easily structured 
as entities legally separated from their sponsors. A great 
number of resource projects have since been funded 
using project financing techniques. The major benefits 
of project financing relate to risks associated with infor-
mation costs, credit risk, and sovereign risk, which are 
key considerations for the resources sector.
At its core, project f inancing is a form of asset-
based financial engineering. It offers certain advantages 
over traditional forms of corporate financing, but its use 
in the natural resources sector is constrained by two key 
factors: 1) a general mismatch in the investment horizon 
between creditor expectations and actual asset returns 
and 2) a diminished tolerance for lower-than-expected 
cash f lows.
The investment horizon of institutions willing to 
facilitate project financing has steadily decreased over 
the 2007–2012 period and will improve only when 
credit markets loosen. Exhibit 1 illustrates the change 
E X H I B I T  1
Project Financing in the Global Energy Sector, 
2006–2012
Notes: This exhibit shows the average spread over LIBOR, comparative 
BBB rated bond spreads, maximum tenor and gearing, and the number 
of financial institutions engaging in project financing in the energy sector.
Source: AGL Research, Simshauser and Nelson [2012].
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in investment appetite over the 2006–2012 period for 
project financing in the global energy sector. On average, 
interest rate spreads increased from 110 bps to nearly 400 
bps. The spread of BBB rated bonds in the 2011–2012 
period is 130 bps lower than project financing facility 
costs of assets with a similar credit rating, which indicates 
that the appetite to finance longer-term projects is likely 
to diminish during periods of relative credit scarcity. In 
addition, the number of syndicated banks in a typical 
project has grown from an average of three to an average 
of eight, the average size of deals has decreased from 
$938 million to $772 million, and the number of institu-
tions actively engaged in project financing has decreased 
markedly (see also Simshauser and Nelson [2012]).
Mandated Lead Arranger (MLA) banks referred to 
in Exhibit 1 are institutions that take the lead in struc-
turing and underwriting the financing of the project, 
and then typically also arrange the syndication of the 
loan. Exhibit 2 illustrates the average tenor, average 
facility spread, and average size of all global project 
financing deals in the energy sector over the 1981–2007 
and 2008–2011 periods. This result highlights the gen-
eral decline in risk appetite for project financing as an 
investment class evidenced by a decline in the average 
facility size and an increase in credit spreads.
Short-term variations in cash f lows also create 
concerns for project financiers. The potential for low 
or negative cash f lows, even over short periods, is moni-
tored carefully by project financiers who have histor-
ically not been shy to invoke default actions upon a 
project experiencing minor diff iculties. Financing is 
not viewed as a form of partnership between lender(s) 
and borrower but is seen in the more traditional sense 
of debtor and creditor, and legally the differences are 
trivial. An avenue is therefore available for new sources 
of funding that employ an alternate investment model 
and permit other forms of profit and risk sharing, par-
ticularly for projects with long investment horizons.
ISLAMIC FINANCING OPPORTUNITIES
Shariáh offers unique challenges in banking and 
finance practices. Islamic economic systems seek to bal-
ance economic growth with economic justice, promote 
prosperity and job creation, and lead to the further adop-
tion of Islamic economic and financial practices (Rehman 
[2008]). A distinctive feature of Islamic finance is that it 
is asset based while conventional financiers are monetary 
based. “Money” in an Islamic economy has no intrinsic 
value; rather its principle purpose is as a medium of 
exchange. This attracts greater emphasis in Islamic sys-
tems than it does in the West. Financing under Islamic 
principles is typically based on the exchange of non-
liquid assets with the principle aim being to create real 
assets and inventories. The basic innovations in Islamic 
project financing in the past decade include the use of 
istisna (a commission to manufacture contract), mur baha 
(a cost-plus sale), ijara (a financial lease), and sukuk (an 
Islamic bond).
 Understanding Islamic Contractual 
Prohibitions
Musha-raka (partnership f inance) and muda-raba 
(venture capital finance) are the real and ideal types of 
Islamic financing, respectively. Financing on the basis of 
musha-raka creates real assets because the financier earns 
a profit through the manufacture (istisna) or receipt and 
sale (salam) of real goods. Muda-raba as 
well as financial leases are not original 
modes of financing, so they are reshaped 
in a manner that they can be used as 
modes of financing, subject to certain 
conditions. Hence, they are “ideal.” 
Both musha-raka and muda-raba imply 
partnerships and the sharing of profits. 
In practice, however, most Islamic banks 
apply mura-baha, a mark-up method of 
financing trade, which involves relatively 
little risk for a bank. A mura-baha con-
tract occurs when a financial institution 
purchases an asset, takes title to it, and 
E X H I B I T  2
Global Project Financing Deals in the Energy Sector, 1981–2007 
and 2008–2011
Notes: This exhibit gives the number, average facility spread, and average size of global project 
financing deals in the energy sector.
Source: AGL Research, Simshauser and Nelson [2012].
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then resells it to the customer at a certain profit added 
to the cost. Although there is confusion concerning the 
acceptability of mura-baha, it has been suggested that 
it is a sale contract rather than a loan, and the transac-
tion being financed must involve a real “commodity” 
(Usmani [2002]). The financier must therefore own the 
“commodity,” and it is this legal responsibility that justi-
fies the financier’s mark-up.
Where direct purchase by the financier for resale 
may not be feasible, under Shariáh it is permissible for 
the bank to appoint the client as its agent to purchase the 
commodity. In this case, it is still the bank that assumes 
responsibility for any risks involving the commodity. 
A number of Islamic jurisdictions state that mura-baha 
debt cannot be securitized, thus making sukuk backed 
by pools of mura-baha debt impermissible. The sale of a 
document representing money is judged to be the same 
as trading money and thus violates the principle of riba. 
However, the prevailing view among less conservative 
jurisdictions is that so long as the underlying receivable is 
connected to a true trade transaction or to a commercial 
transfer of a non-monetary interest, such a receivable 
can be traded freely without violating compliance with 
Shariáh (Abdel-Khaleq and Richardson [2007]).
There has been some discussion in the literature of 
the rights and liabilities of those participating in musha-
raka and muda-raba f inancing contracts (McMillen 
[2001], Usmani [2002], and Mahlknecht [2009]). All 
partners have the right to take part in the management 
of a musha-raka company, but their remuneration as 
agents working for the joint venture is distinct from 
their returns as investors. Unless stipulated in the ini-
tial agreement, any partner has the right to terminate a 
musha-raka agreement at any time, although a period of 
notice must be given to the other partners. To prevent 
a partner withdrawing from a musha-raka in its infancy, 
which may damage the longer-term financial interests of 
the other partners, it is permissible to establish an initial 
agreement that allows a partner to sell his shareholding 
to the other partners without the musha-raka lapsing 
(Rehman [2008]). This is an important consideration 
for syndicated offerings.
Sukuk offerings are perhaps the most malleable 
of the Islamic financing structures. A sukuk offering is 
an asset-backed instrument that represents a beneficial 
ownership interest in an underlying asset. A sukuk is a 
certificate that appears like a traditional bond or asset-
backed security but is, in fact, technically neither debt 
nor equity. Sukuk are normally combined with other 
forms of Islamic finance (many are musha-raka based), 
and they are best viewed as a means to raise funds from 
a wider spectrum of investors rather than as an entirely 
separate category of Islamic banking (Richardson 
[2006]). Any project structure that generates or con-
tributes to the generation of a revenue stream is subject 
to securitization for the purposes of a sukuk offering. A 
true asset-backed sukuk is functionally a portion of the 
title in the assets under it, and as such, it enables a form 
of partial retention of title for the Islamic financiers.
Islamic financiers however must be careful to avoid 
adopting a restricted view of understanding Shariáh by 
focusing only on the legal forms of structured finance 
contracts rather than on the underlying substance of 
the agreement. An emphasis of form over substance 
can lead to the abuse of Shariáh principles in justifying 
certain contracts, which in fact are contradictory to 
the Shariáh text and may undermine the higher objec-
tives of Shariáh (Dusuki [2010]). This poses significant 
operational risks to both the investor and financier if 
Islamic regulators declare a violation of Shariáh law at 
any stage of a project’s life and contracts therefore have 
to be unwound. It is important to note that Islamic 
finance is not simply an exercise in semantics to invoke 
euphemisms to disguise interest and circumvent the 
many Shariáh prohibitions.
Retention of Title
A key consideration for structuring Shariáh-com-
pliant project f inancing is to ensure that the Islamic 
financier retains title in the operating assets of the project 
aligned with the practice of mura-baha. This stems from 
the Shariáh requirement that the financier share in the 
profits and losses of the transaction (Holden [2007]). 
Structuring projects to accommodate this requirement 
paves the way for Western financial institutions to coop-
erate in project financing with Islamic institutions, and 
overcomes many Shariáh prohibitions. Title retention 
for the Islamic participants not only facilitates the par-
ticipation of external interests in projects but also allows 
for the participation of Shariáh-compliant financing in 
almost all regions and investment sectors.
Western lending practices do not call for retention 
of title of the assets and generally evaluate projected cash 
f lows from the project to determine the likelihood of 
repayment. Instead of retaining title, Western lenders 
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will take a security interest in the project assets to miti-
gate the risk of default. In project finance, a security 
interest is a right of a lender to possess and/or sell the 
project assets in order to satisfy debts to the lender in the 
event of default. Although security interest in the project 
assets will not completely cover the loan, the nature of 
the security does provide some protection in the event 
of default. If the project defaults, the Western lenders’ 
security interest provides them with a claim to the assets 
that takes precedence over other unsecured claims.
If the project defaults, the Islamic lender will 
already possess title to the project assets that the Islamic 
funds helped purchase. The Islamic lenders can therefore 
dispose of the assets to satisfy the outstanding debt obli-
gations. A rahn-adl arrangement can satisfy the dual pur-
pose of allowing for the retention of title in the project 
assets with Islamic lenders while also enabling Western 
lenders to have a security interest in the financed assets. 
From the lender’s perspective, a Western security interest 
and Islamic title retention can function similarly if the 
project defaults (Richardson [2006]). It is seldom the 
case, however, that only a single lender issues a single 
tranche of debt and, as projects grow in size and com-
plexity, the distinction between title and securitization 
can be a complication, although recent experience has 
shown that this complication does not provide insur-
mountable obstacles (Rehman [2008]).
RESOURCE SECTOR FUNDING USING 
ISLAMIC FINANCE
Limited-Recourse Lending and Shariáh
Shariáh-compliant project f inancing is available 
in Western nations via a mechanism that retains title 
in the project’s assets by the Islamic lenders. Sukuk 
offerings are popular in the Middle East. Most offer-
ings are asset based, meaning that investors structure the 
purchase from the originator to buy back the assets on 
either a scheduled or early redemption. In contrast, the 
less-common asset-backed securities issued by Islamic 
finance institutions rely on a securitization that involves 
asset transfers from an originator into a trust or similar 
special-purpose vehicle (SPV) with sukuk issuance by 
that SPV and payments on the sukuk derived from the 
payments received in respect of those transferred assets. 
Asset-backed sukuk holders hold fractional undivided 
ownership interest in an asset or pool of assets and 
are thus a form of partial title in the underlying asset. 
Asset-based sukuk necessarily depend on the credit of 
the issuer. Historically, asset securitization has been rare 
due to the inability to obtain credit ratings, although 
some sovereign issues have been proxy rated to match 
the rating of sovereign credit (McMillen [2001]).
Mineral Rights
Of great interest to Shariáh—compliant financing 
is the possibility of joint ownership of mineral rights, the 
ability to transfer a mineral estate without transferring 
property, and the ability to separate operating interest 
from a passive interest that receives only income from 
production. The ability to carve out well-defined inter-
ests with clearly established attendant rights under law 
fits appropriately with the Shariáh emphasis on ensuring 
clarity in the description of the subject matter in the 
investment agreements.
In many developed countries such as the U.S., 
Canada and Australia, mineral estates (ownership of 
minerals or oil/gas in the ground) and interests derived 
from them (royalties) are legally defined as a form of real 
property. As real property with well-defined rights in 
law, ownership in mineral projects can be easily trans-
ferred, in whole or in part, in a variety of ways. Both 
privately owned and government-administered mineral 
leases can be severed, subleased, assigned, or encum-
bered without necessarily altering their characterization 
as real property. Mineral rights laws further allow for 
the transfer of certain kinds of partial ownership rights 
so that one party may control the working interest and 
operate the leasehold while other parties may hold pas-
sive royalty interests (investors who neither participate 
in operations nor bear any costs of development). Thus, 
ownership can be tailored to the needs of project inves-
tors by allowing for the creation of indirect beneficial 
ownership interests that can be held by Islamic inves-
tors, which is critical for Shariáh compliance. Interests 
in mineral leaseholds may also enjoy certain protections 
in bankruptcy, which can improve the securitization 
process (Richardson [2006]). Importantly, mineral assets 
can be mortgaged and investors can hold security inter-
ests, which permits the maintenance of collateral in the 
event of a breach of contract by the borrower. There-
fore in terms of legal structure, Islamic finance and the 
laws governing minerals and oil/gas in many developed 
countries can offer ideal partnership opportunities.
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Exhibit 3 illustrates a Shariáh-compliant project 
financing structure for a hypothetical mineral extrac-
tion project. Each component of the project must be 
Shariáh-compliant including the sources of funding 
(sukuk, muda-raba, and mura-baha), commodity off-take 
(Shariáh-compliant formal undertaking), construction 
contracts (istisna’a) and leases (ijara). Projects of this 
kind can not only include mines themselves but also 
can be limited to processing plants, rail and port facili-
ties, storage yards, and enabling assets (mining camps, 
pipelines, and so on).
An ijara agreement is an Islamic f inance lease 
(or sale-leaseback) used to purchase property, plant, or 
machinery (Tacy [2006]). The lessor leases the assets 
for a set term at an established rental price, and at lease 
termination, the assets can either revert back to the lessor 
or be acquired by the lessee. Unlike traditional leases, 
there can be no predetermined sales price for the asset 
at the end of the term, and the lessee cannot be required 
to purchase the asset at the end of the term. Also, the 
financier is generally responsible for maintaining insur-
ance. Therefore, ijara are more akin to operating leases 
rather than capital leases. In the context of the resources 
sector, an ijara is an ideal mechanism for leveraged lease 
f inancing of capital equipment, including processing 
plants, trucks, deepwater platforms, and drill ships. Crit-
ically, however, in the context of a sukuk offering, the 
value of such equipment should not represent a material 
percentage of the total financing amount (Vishwanath 
and Azmi [2009]). Ijara agreements are not prevalent in 
the resources sector; however, they are a legally robust 
substitute for conventional leverage lease or sale-lease-
back structures within Shariáh-compliant financing. In 
contrast istisna’a is a vehicle for the financing of large 
infrastructure projects and is currently the most widely 
used Shariáh-compliant funding of long-term project 
f inancings. With istisna’a agreements, assets are con-
structed for the project. Such assets can include pro-
cessing plants, rail and port facilities, ref ineries, and 
petrochemical plants.
Investment Profiles
Anecdotal observations indicate that Western finan-
cial institutions tend to avoid commitment to investment 
tenors greater than around seven years (Gilson, John, and 
Lang [1990] and Esty and Megginson [2003]). This has 
resulted in the adoption of alternative project finance 
structures over the past decade. The generally high cost 
of resource projects as well as other ineff iciencies in 
E X H I B I T  3
Project Finance Structure for a Resource Project Using Shariáh-Compliant Financing
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the business cycle over the 2000–2012 period has also 
resulted in a shortening of the maturity of liabilities 
manifest in the shortening of debt maturities. Frictions 
arising from asymmetric information are more severe 
with longer horizons than with shorter horizons, and 
thus, beyond a certain maturity, adverse selection is too 
severe for financing to be sustained. Specifically, there is 
asymmetric information about the riskiness and default 
probabilities of firms.
To analyze the differences between sources of 
funding for the resources sector, we examine a sample 
of data that compares loan statistics among categories. 
The non-Islamic data for the 1980–1999 period used in 
this analysis are from the Loanware database provided by 
Capital Data. This database contains detailed historical 
information on a great number of syndicated loans and 
related banking instruments booked on international 
capital markets. From 1999 to 2010, the data were 
sourced from the Thomson Reuters financial database. 
In each case, we only extracted data related to the global 
mining and natural resources sector. Using a sample of 
over 10,000 syndicated loans with a notional value of 
around $3 trillion, we compared the financial charac-
teristics and geographic and industrial distributions of 
project financed loans with various non-project finance 
subsamples and syndicated loans. Islamic fund data were 
obtained from the Liquidity Management Centre (LMC) 
Bahrain database over the 1980–2010 period.
Exhibit 4 illustrates the main characteristics of each 
loan type used by firms in the global resources sector. 
It presents several loan structure variables as well as the 
use for which a loan is arranged. Although most are self-
explanatory, we define a loan as having currency risk if 
the denomination of the loan (and its currency of repay-
ment) differs from the currency of the borrower’s home 
country. The data results over the 1980–2000 period are 
largely similar to the mining and natural resources data 
observed in Kleimeier and Megginson [2000], which 
we have used to cross-reference our results. The third 
column provides the main characteristics of all known 
sukuk offerings over the 1980–2010 period from the 
LMC database.
Based on t-tests comparing the values of each vari-
able in the project f inancing sample with the corre-
sponding values in the all syndicated loan sample and 
in the other loan purpose subsamples, we found that 
almost all differences between the project f inancing 
sample values and the corresponding values for other 
loan categories, in particular with sukuk offerings, are 
statistically significant.
Average spreads are lower for project finance loans 
(132 bps) than they are for the full sample of all syndi-
E X H I B I T  4
Characteristics of Project Finance vs. Other Syndicated Loan Samples
a indicates that the t-test has not been applied to these variables.
* indicates that based on a two-sample t-test assuming unequal variances, the difference between the value for this facility and the value for project financing 
is significant at the 5% level. All other values are not statistically significant at 5%.
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cated loans (141 bps), treasury loans (185 bps), and cap-
ital structure facilities (139 bps). It is generally assumed 
that the spread for project f inance facilities exceeds 
non-project finance loans due to the nature of limited-
recourse lending as well as the higher perceived risk 
levels of most projects. The average maturity of project 
f inance facilities (9.6 years) is well in excess of full 
sample of syndicated loans (4.2 years) and other facility 
types (between 4 and 5.1 years). The average spread for 
sukuk offerings observed over the period was 137 bps 
with an average maturity of 7.4 years, which is similar to 
project finance facility spreads and tenors. This implies 
that sukuk buyers are already relatively comfortable with 
these risk levels for assets with longer maturities.
The level of fees and the number of participating 
institutions indirectly indicates that the provision of 
project finance facilities demands greater compensation 
than other loan types. The total average level for com-
mitment and participation fees for project finance facili-
ties (101.3 bps) are significantly higher than the levels for 
the full sample of syndicated loans (76.3 bps) and for the 
other facility types, with an exception for general corpo-
rate loans, which have a slightly higher total average fee. 
The total fees are, however, largely similar to the total 
average level for commitment and participation fees for 
sukuk offerings (114 bps), indicating a relative alignment 
in complexity of both project finance and sukuk facili-
ties. Additionally, the average number of 
banks participating in project finance facili-
ties in the resources sector (4.1 banks) is 
different from the average for all loans in the 
resources sector (7.3 banks) and other loan 
types. These findings suggest that institu-
tions are compensated by relatively high 
up-front fees to motivate participation in 
project finance lending as well as being gen-
erally less inclined to maintain large stakes 
in project finance facilities compared with 
other forms of credit.
These results also suggest that in terms 
of facility tenor, spread over LIBOR, struc-
turing cost, the number of tranches, and 
the number of syndication parties, the 
sukuk offerings are very similar to project 
financing deals observed, while other tra-
ditional loan facilities exhibit a significantly 
different facility size and tenor and number 
of average syndication parties. The key 
characteristics of spread and maturity, however, show 
that project finance facilities in the resources sector are 
largely aligned with the risk and loan maturity levels 
observed for Islamic fund investors.
Exhibit 5 outlines the distribution of asset returns 
from explicit Islamic and non-Islamic project financing 
deals measured against project-financed investments in 
the resources sector over the 2000–2012 period using 
the same datasets as earlier. Asset returns are given as the 
present value of the current estimated asset value rela-
tive to the initial investment cost. The distribution of 
Islamic project finance investments closely replicates the 
distribution of project finance facilities in the resources 
sector, particularly at the upper and lower extremes, 
which indicates a greater tolerance of Islamic investors to 
the risks and returns in natural resources project finance 
activities. Non-Islamic investments have a distribution 
of returns that is highly dense around the 50%–150% 
level, which suggests a broad level of risk aversion by 
non-Islamic project f inanciers who look to invest in 
projects that, on average, at least break even.
Importantly, however, non-Islamic investments 
also experience significantly lower returns than Islamic 
project-finance investments below the 50% level. Dis-
counting those projects that fail and earn zero return, 
Islamic investors experience a much broader spread of 
returns, which is more naturally aligned with the dis-
E X H I B I T  5
Distribution of Asset Returns from Islamic and Non-Islamic Project 
Financing Measured against Project-Financed Investments in the 
Resources Sector, 2000-2012
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tribution of returns in resource sector project-financed 
investments.
The similarities in investment risk and return 
profiles, funding costs, and facility tenor suggest that 
Islamic investors are very well suited to project financing 
in the global resources sector. Although Islamic funds 
currently invest heavily in this sector in the Middle 
East, there appears to be signif icant historical align-
ment between Islamic investors and resource companies 
seeking funding through project finance structures.
Project Profiles
Historically, resource sector project f inancing 
using Islamic structures has been concentrated in oil 
and gas ventures. However the risk–return profiles in 
the oil and gas sector are marginally different from those 
in the traditional mining and minerals sector. Exhibit 6 
illustrates the typical cash f low profiles of both oil and 
gas projects and mining projects, each with an expected 
life of 24 years. The net present value (NPV) for each of 
these profiles is equivalent at a cost of capital 12%, while 
the modified internal rate of return (MIRR) differs by 
around 5%. Much of the capital expenditure in the oil 
and gas sector is upfront with stable and then declining 
revenue from production over the life of the project. 
The mining and minerals sector, however, requires sub-
stantial upfront investment followed by generally stable 
revenue interspersed between periods of signif icant 
additional capital expenditure. Rehabilitation costs at 
the end of the project life can also be significant. This 
type of profile, which requires debt refinancing through 
project life, usually concerns some Western financiers 
who are unfamiliar with mining cost profiles. Based 
this analysis of the investment profile, financing cost, 
and maturity preference of Islamic investors, however, 
mining and resources companies with Shariáh-compliant 
funding may be better matched to Islamic investors than 
to Western financial institutions.
Not all project financing deals involve high-risk 
assets. Some firms have used project finance for activities 
that have a low cost of financial distress. Many resource 
projects contain economically independent but tangible 
assets that do not lose much value during default or after 
restructuring. Because the assets have few alternative 
uses, an efficient restructuring is generally more likely 
than an inefficient liquidation (Esty [2002]). The recog-
nition that projects maintain a similar value to those of 
going concerns encourages both subordinate and senior 
claimants to prefer rapid restructurings to alternative 
uncertain outcomes. This phenomenon clearly benefits 
Islamic financiers.
One key drawback of Islamic f inancing is 
the lack of a forum for reaching consensus on 
issues relating to Shariáh compliance through a 
regulatory body. The Islamic Financial Services 
Board publishes various technical standards for 
financial institutions, while other institutions 
including the International Islamic Financial 
Market, the Liquidity Management Centre, 
and the International Islamic Rating Agency 
lend some support to standardizing Islamic 
financing principles. However, the regulatory 
frameworks do not explicitly create a universal 
set of rules. The lack of regulation could make 
Islamic finance more country specific or even 
Shariáh-board specif ic, which would limit 
potential sources of capital. A more uniform 
approach to regulation by a sanctioned Shariáh 
compliance body could potentially address this 
deficiency and permit Islamic and even conven-
tional financial institutions to offer compliant 
Shariáh financing.
E X H I B I T  6
Cash Flow Distributions for a Mining and an Oil/Gas Project 
for a Resource with a 24-Year Life
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
Islamic finance is better suited to certain type of 
projects than others. Islamic finance lends itself well to 
projects that incorporate a discrete set of assets that can 
be owned by the Islamic financiers without too much 
potential intrusion on the enjoyment of such rights by 
conventional banks under inter-creditor arrangements; 
see, for instance, Jobst [2007]. Furthermore, the assets 
owned by the Islamic f inanciers must be separable 
and have economic value as standalone assets. Islamic 
funding principles offer a natural fit with the desirable 
features of project finance opportunities, particularly in 
the global resources sector. This is a source of untapped 
potential.
The key to Shariáh compliance is to facilitate the 
retention of title in the project’s assets by Islamic lenders. 
Once the lender has title to these assets, they are sub-
ject to the risks of the project and any return on the 
investment will be in the form of rents on the assets, as 
opposed to riba. Shariáh-compliant f inancing is well 
suited for project finance due to the nature of the proj-
ects typically undertaken in project finance transactions. 
Such projects tend to be large industrial or infrastruc-
ture projects whose cash f lows can be projected to some 
extent, which avoids the prohibition on gharar. So long 
as the project does not facilitate activity that is haram the 
project is generally Shariáh-compliant.
For Islamic investors, project f inance in the 
resources sector offers an avenue not only for invest-
ment but also for infrastructure development and eco-
nomic diversif ication. As competition for access to 
Islamic funds increases, those project finance investors 
with the greatest understanding and willingness to work 
with Shariáh-compliant finance practices can gain an 
advantage in accessing an important alternative source 
of capital.
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